In a standard Bayesian setting, there is often ambiguity in prior choice, as one may have not sufficient information to uniquely identify a suitable prior probability measure encapsulating initial beliefs. To overcome this, we specify a set P of plausible prior probability measures; as more and more data are collected, P is updated using Jeffrey's rule of conditioning, an alternative to Bayesian updating which proves to be more philosophically compelling in many situations. We build the sequence (P * k ) of successive updates of P and we develop an ergodic theory for its limit, for countable and uncountable sample space Ω. A result of this ergodic theory is a strong law of large numbers when Ω is uncountable. We also develop procedure for updating lower probabilities using Jeffrey's rule of conditioning.
In this paper, we adopt a decision theoretic approach. We consider an agent (for us, the statistician) that faces a decision under ambiguity, that is, she faces a problem in which information -e.g. based on physical (urns) or symmetry (coins) considerations -restricts her reasonable initial beliefs to belong to a set P of plausible prior probability measures. 1 This approach is outlined in [7] , and is based on the following consideration by [12] : "Out of the set of all possible distributions [on the sample space
[Ω], there remains a set [P] of distributions that still seem 'reasonable', [.. .] that his [the statistician's] information -perceived as scanty, unreliable, ambiguous -does not permit him confidently to rule out [...] He might suspect [that his best estimate P among the elements of P] might vary almost hourly with his mood."
Notice that this approach hides some measure theoretic complications: the "boundary elements" of P, that is, the infimum and the supremum of the set, are not probability measures, but rather lower and upper probability measures, respectively, a particular type of Choquet capacity. These are monotone set functions that are widely used in applications where standard additive probabilities turn out to be inadequate (see [19] ).
A natural way of updating the elements of P may seem, then, to be the Bayesian one, especially because there exists a well developed theory of Bayesian updating for Choquet capacities, see e.g. [21] .
In this paper for reasons we make clear in the following text we instead use Jeffrey's rule of conditioning, known in the literature as probability kinematics (introduced in [15] , and further developed in [16, 17] ). Following the notation in [11] the procedure for updating beliefs in probability kinematics is
for all A ∈ F, where F is the σ-algebra endowed to Ω. This describes the update of our initial subjective probability P to P * ; it is valid when there is a partition {E j } of the sample space Ω such that P * (A | E j ) = P (A | E j ) ∀A ∈ F, ∀j.
It has the practical advantage of reducing the assessment of P * to the simpler task of assessing P * (E j ).
We now provide an example of how subjective probabilities are updated in probability kinematics.
Example 1. We are given a sample space Ω and three observations consistent with partition E 1 = {E j } 3 j=1 as well as a current subjective probability P . In probability kinematics it is natural to link partitions to the occurrence of events as E j = "observation ω j ∈ Ω occurred". A partition consistent with these three events in depicted in Figure 1 . Now consider an event consistent with the blue shaded circle in Figure 1 , an event A ∈ F. Our goal in this example is to explain how we would compute P * (A) using probability kinematics. 1 Incompleteness of information is captured by the nonsingleton nature of P. 
j=1 for the whole space Ω. The blue shaded circle represents a generic A ∈ F whose probability we would like to assess.
We first require knowledge of P (E 1 ), P (E 2 ), P (E 3 ), all of which we will set to 1 3 in this example. We then need to specify the current conditional conditional probabilities P (A | E 1 ) = p, P (A | E 2 ) = q, and P (A | E 3 ) = r, for some p, q, r ∈ (0, 1) and we know that
Remark 1.1. Reassessing the probability distribution every time a new partition comes in may seem a daunting task; this can be addressed by considering the sequence of finest possible partitions. This means that if we observe ω t = ω s , then we are going to consider a partition such that ω t ∈ E t , ω s ∈ E s , and E t ∩ E s = ∅. Now suppose we want to reassess P on the new partition E 2 = {E j }.
The number of elements of the latter partition will be greater or equal to the number of elements of the previous partition, because we collected more new observations. Then, say we want to assess the probability P (E k ) for some k. We may proceed mechanically as follows: denote as the number of unique observations within one of the elements of the previous partition, one of which is such that Then, the mechanical assessment described in Remark 1.1 gives us the following: P (E 1 ) = P (E 1 ),
Remark 1.2. Example 1 was motivated by [2] , Example 10, which examined whether observing the same result in two different experiments yields the same analysis, thus verifying the likelihood principle.
In [2] the random variables on Ω can only take values in X = {1, 2, 3} and the parameter space was set as Θ = {θ 1 , θ 2 }. In Example 1, A can be considered as the event {X 1 = 1}, for some random variable X 1 : Ω → X . 3 In this case from probability kinematics we would get
Notice that in (3) we made explicit the dependence of P on the vector of parameters θ. In our setting, the elements of P may be different due to the parameters: for instance, P could be the set of gamma distributions with shape parameter α ∈ [0, 1], and rate parameter β ∈ [4, 5] .
We choose to update our beliefs using Jeffrey's rule of conditioning rather than Bayes' rule, P * (A) = P (A | E) = P (A∩E) P (E) , because classical Bayesian updating presupposes that both P (E) and P (A ∩ E) have been quantified before event E happened. In many circumstances this will not be the case, for instance when the event E is not anticipated. The following more subtle argument for why Bayes' rule may not be adequate comes from [11] . The conditional probability P (A | E) is the probability we currently would attribute to an event A if in addition to our present beliefs we were to learn of the event E. The equality P (A | E) = P (A∩E) P (E) results from a theorem derived from the assumption of coherence [10] . Thus if we were to learn that E is actually true, Bayes' rule would require us to adopt the new probability P * (A) = P (A | E). [18] pointed out why Bayesian updating may not be reasonable: "[The degree of belief in p given q] is not the same as the degree to which [a subject] would believe p, if he believed q for certain; for knowledge of q might for psychological reasons profoundly alter his whole system of beliefs." A related observation was made in [13] : "[Subjective] probabilities can change in the light of calculations or of pure thought without any change in the empirical data."
Another reason for which Bayes' rule should not be the only model for belief revision is the assumption about the form in which new information is received. [17] states that: "It is rarely or never that there is a proposition for which the direct effect of an observation is to change the observer's degree of belief in that proposition to 1."
Conditioning on an event requires the assignment of an initial probability to that event prior to its observation, a task that often seems forced, unrealistic, or impossible.
In this paper, we provide an ergodic theory for the limit of the sequence of successive Jeffrey's updates of our initial set of plausible probability measures P.
We consider a measurable space (Ω, F), which represents the space where ultimately uncertainty lives, and we let P be a compact set of probability measures on Ω, which is the set of plausible (prior) probability measures with which we can endow (Ω, F). We let T : Ω → Ω be an F\F-measurable transformation, and f : Ω → R belong to B(Ω, F), the set of bounded and F-measurable functionals on Ω. Given any element ω ∈ Ω, we consider the sequence
for some n ∈ N; clearly, this could be interpreted as a finite sequence of orbits of the operator if we were in the classical stochastic process setting.
We consider both cases where Ω is countable and uncountable.We consider the sequence of finest possible partitions induced by observations in (4) and revise our beliefs using Jeffrey's rule of conditioning. Iterating this process we build a sequence (P * k ) k∈N 0 with P * 0 ≡ P. In Corollary 2.2.1 we provide an ergodic theorem for the convergence of the sequence (P * k ) to the limiting set P * ∞ for the countable case. For the uncountable case, Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.1.2 are ergodic theorems for the convergence of the sequence (P * k ); Corollary 3.1.1 states a shaper result than Theorem 3.1 that holds when the limiting set P * ∞ is a singleton. In the uncountable case, Theorem 4.1 states a strong law of large numbers for the convergence of (P * k ) and Corollary 4.1.1 refines the result for the case where P * ∞ is a singleton. The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we present the ergodic results for the countable and uncountable setting, respectively. In Section 4 state the strong law of large numbers.
Section 5 is a discussion. Appendix A is a discussion of Jeffrey's updating for lower probability measures. Appendix B is a discussion of Birkhoff's ergodic theorem and how it is applied in our paper.
Appendix C contains the poofs of the theorems and corollaries.
Ergodicity in the countable sample space case
In this section, we show the ergodicity of the sequence (P * k ) for the Ω countable case. The limit of the empirical average 1 n n−1 j=0 f (T j ω) belongs to the interval generated by the boundary elements of P *
If P * ∞ is a singleton, the interval reduces to a single element. Let (Ω, F) be a standard measurable space, and let Ω be countable. 4 Denote I as the initial partition of Ω; as we collect more data we update I. In particular, we will deal with partitions of
It is useful to think of E ω as "E ω = ω has occurred". In this notation, we can specify a partition {E T j ω } n−1 j=0 , for any n ∈ N. Notice that the number of unique elements of {E T j ω } n−1 j=0 may be m < n, for example if two or more T j ω's are equal. Denote ∆(Ω, F) as the set of probability measures on Ω, and consider the following metric of
For any number n ∈ N of observations, we consider the update of E 0 ≡ I to be the finest possible partition; for the partition E 1 = {E T j ω } n j=1 , the following is true:
As we collect more observations we update E 1 to E 2 , the finest possible partition generated by all observations available. Repeating this process, we build the sequence of successive finest possible partitions (E k ) k∈N 0 .
Upon observing events E T j ω 's within partition E 1 , we revise our (subjective) plausible probability measures P ∈ P using Jeffrey's rule of conditioning as in (1); we get P * , the set of updated plausible probability measures.
Denote (P * k ) k∈N 0 as the sequence of successive updates of our initial plausible set P via Jeffrey's rule of conditioning. 5 Corollary 2.1.1. The sequence of successive updating (P * k ) k∈N 0 is a sequence of compact sets. 4 Recall that a measurable space is standard if it is isomorphic to some separable complete metric space endowed with the Borel σ-algebra. 5 In this notation, P * 0 ≡ P, and P * 1 denotes the set P * we studied in Proposition 2.1; (P * k ) and (E k ) are intimately related by equation (1).
For any k ∈ N 0 , fix any A ∈ F and compute:
This is a lower probability measure, that is a Choquet capacity. A generic Choquet capacity is defined as a set function ν :
As we can see, we do not require additivity to hold for capacities. In particular,
where denotes the union of disjoint events A, B ∈ F.
A probability measure is an additive capacity.
We denote an upper probability measure P * k as
, for all A ∈ F and k ∈ N 0 . The upper and lower posteriors provide a type of "confidence interval" around the "true" posterior in the flavor of robust statistics ( [14] , Chapter 10). We discuss the procedure for updating lower probabilities in Appendix A.
Given a generic Choquet capacity ν, its core is the set defined by
The core is the collection of all probabilities that setwise dominate ν. 6 A generic Choquet capacity ν is (T -)invariant if, for all A ∈ F,
where T is the F\F-measurable transformation defined earlier.
For any k ∈ N 0 , consider the finest possible partition E k = {E T j ω } n−1 j=0 available given all n observations so far. Let P u ∈ ∆(Ω, F) be such that P u (E T j ω ) = 1 n , j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}. The following is an ancillary result that will prove crucial for the ergodic theorem.
for all n ∈ N.
6 core(ν) is compact in the weak * topology.
As the number n of observations we collect grows to infinity, the sequence (E k ) converges to the atomic partition E ∞ = {E T j ω } ∞ j=0 by construction. This latter is described as follows: for all ω ≡ T j ω = T k ω ≡ ω , E T j ω = {ω }, and E T k ω = {ω }. Convergence of partitions is in the following sense:
fix T j ω and consider the element E k T j ω in E k , and the element E ∞ T j ω in E ∞ . 7 The Hausdorff distance between these elements goes to 0 as k goes to infinity
where d is the metric on Ω that makes it a complete separable metric space in such a way that F is then the Borel σ-algebra. The second equality holds because there is only one element in E ∞ T j ω , T j ω ≡ ω . This convergence holds for any E k T j ω in E k and any E ∞ T j ω in E ∞ ; we call this metric d p , and
Let us denote by P * ∞ the limit in the Hausdorff distance (if it exists) of (P * k ); that is,
where P * ∞ is the lower probability associated with P * ∞ ,
and P * ∞ (A) := 1 − P * ∞ (A c ) for all A ∈ F. 8 We now state our ergodic result.
for all T j ω. 8 Notice that the distance of uniform convergence for Choquet capacities generalizes naturally the one for the additive case; in particular, we have that the sequence (νn) converges to some capacity ν in dU if and only if |νn(A) − ν(A)| → 0, for all A ∈ F. Also, if P * ∞ = {P } ⊂ ∆(Ω, G), then there exists f ∈ B(Ω, G) such that
for all ω ∈ Ω.
Here G ⊂ F denotes the set of invariant events, A ∈ G ⇐⇒ A ∈ F and T −1 (A) = A. This is a version of the ergodic theorem for the countable setting for the limit P * ∞ of the sequence (P * k ) of successive Jeffrey's updates of our initial set of plausible probability measures P.
Ergodicity in the uncountable sample space case
In this section, we show the ergodicity of the sequence (P * k ) for the Ω uncountable case. We will show that if P * ∞ is ergodic then the limit of the empirical average 1 Let Ω be uncountable. For the set of probability measures ∆(Ω, F) we define the following distance d w and notion of weak convergence where for all (P n ) ∈ ∆(Ω,
with C b (Ω) denoting the set of continuous and bounded functionals on Ω.
[11] specify a way of updating P to P * using probability kinematics when the sample space Ω is uncountable. Let (Ω, F, P ) be a probability space that describes our current subjective beliefs about the σ-algebra of events F. Let P * be a new probability measure on F and let F 0 ⊂ F be a sub-σalgebra. Let C be an F 0 -measurable set such that P (C) = 0 and P F 0 P * F 0 on Ω\C, where P F 0 , P * F 0 are the restrictions to F 0 of P and P * , respectively. Then, the appropriate version of Jeffrey's condition 
for all A ∈ F. If P * P , we can take C = ∅. We update any P * k ∈ P * k to P * k+1 ∈ P * k+1 following (8); we discuss how to update lower probabilities in this context in Appendix A.
In this more general setting a simple example is hard to give so we limit ourselves to providing the updating algorithm. 9
• We observe (T j ω) n−1 j=0 ;
• We compute σ (T j ω) n−1 j=0 =: F 1 ;
• For any set A ∈ F, we compute:
• We find P * ∈ ∆(Ω, F) such that:
-P * P (for simplicity).
• Finally, we compute P * (A) by solving Ω P (A | F 1 ) dP * .
As new observations come in as (T j ω) m−1 j=n , we compute σ (T j ω) m−1 j=0 =: F 2 . Clearly, F 2 ⊃ F 1 .
Repeating this process, we build an increasing sequence (F k ) k∈N of sub-σ-algebras. (P * k ) and (F k ) are intimately related by the updating algorithm, as are F ∞ := k∈N F k and P * ∞ . We now define three concepts that play a key role in stating ergodicity when Ω is uncountable, namely the Choquet integral, invariance, and ergodicity for lower probabilities. Consider now the sequence of updates (P * k ) k∈N 0 generated from our initial set of plausible priors P ≡ P * 0 . We denote as P * ∞ ⊂ ∆(Ω, F) the limit in the Hausdorff distance (if it exists) of this sequence or
where P * ∞ and P * ∞ are the lower and upper probability measures associated with P * ∞ , respectively. 11 The first ergodic result is the following. The following corollary states that if P * ∞ is a singleton we obtain an ergodic result very similar to the one in (11) . A sharper version of Theorem 3.1 can be formulated provided some extra assumptions are met.
The following three concepts will be used to specify these assumptions. A generic capacity ν on Ω is
10 Clearly, G ⊂ F 11 Notice that the distance of weak convergence for Choquet capacities generalizes naturally the one for the additive case; in particular, we have that the sequence (νn) converges to some capacity ν in dw if and only if Ω f dνn → Ω f dν, for all f ∈ C b (Ω). In addition, the following are true.
(i) For all P ∈ I, f is a version of the conditional expectation of f given G. 13 (ii) Ω f dP * ∞ = Ω f dP * ∞ .
(iii) If P * ∞ is ergodic, then 
Strong law of large numbers
As an application of Theorem 3.1, we provide a version of the strong law of large numbers for our belief updating procedure.
We will need two definitions in stating the strong law of large numbers. The first is to generalize the notion of a stationary stochastic process to a generic capacity. The second is a classic idea in dynamics and ergodic theory, the notion of a shift map. The two definitions that follow are both from [6] .
Denote f ≡ (f n ) n∈N ∈ B(Ω, F) N as a sequence of bounded and F-measurable functionals on Ω. Given any capacity ν on (Ω, F), we can then define the map ν f : σ(C) → [0, 1] as
We say that f is ergodic if ν f is ergodic with respect to the shift transformation s.
The following is a strong law of large numbers for our belief updating procedure. Notice that the assumption of stationarity yields the fact that the limit lim This corollary gives us a sharper version of the strong law of large numbers provided an extra assumption is met, the upper and lower probabilities of P * ∞ coincide. This captures the idea that as we go on updating our initial set of plausible probability measures P, we become more and more certain about the "true" underlying random generating process.
Conclusion
In this work we consider the problem of a statistician that faces ambiguity and so has to specify a set P of plausible priors instead of a single one to express her initial uncertainty. As we collect more and more data, we update the elements P ∈ P using Jeffrey's rule of conditioning, and we get a set P * of updated probabilities. Repeating this process gives us a sequence (P * k ) of updated sets of probabilities. We then give ergodic theorems for the limit -if it exists -of this latter sequence, for both the Ω countable and uncountable cases. We also provide a version of the Strong Law of Large numbers when Ω is uncountable. A further contribution we make is formulating a way of updating lower probabilities using probability kinematics.
Appendix A: Jeffrey's rule of conditioning for lower probabilities
Countable Ω case Recall that Jeffrey's rule of conditioning when Ω is countable is given in [11] as
for all A ∈ F. This describes the update of our initial subjective probability P to P * ; it is valid when there is a partition {E j } of the sample space Ω such that
Now, suppose that we have to update P * k . Then, (J) becomes the following
, (J sublinear) for all A ∈ F and all j. This generalization comes from Definition 2.6 in [20] , where conditional Choquet capacities are introduced. Then, (9) becomes
for all A ∈ F.
Uncountable Ω case
Recall that Jeffrey's rule of conditioning when Ω is uncountable is given in [11] by
for all A ∈ F, where F 0 ⊂ F is a sub-σ-algebra of F, and C is an F 0 -measurable set such that P (C) = 0. This describes the update of our initial subjective probability P to P * ; it is valid when
that is, P (A | F 0 ) ∩ P * (A | F 0 ) = ∅, ∀A ∈ F. Now, suppose that we have to update P * k . Then, (J') becomes the following:
where the sufficiency condition generalizes to the sublinear case as P *
, for all A ∈ F and all k ∈ N 0 . This generalization comes from Definition 3.5 in [20] , where conditional Choquet capacities given a (sub-)σ-algebra are introduced. Then, (10) becomes:
where the first term in the sum is a Choquet integral, and C is an F 0 -measurable set such that P * k (C) = 0.
Discussion
In Definition 3.5 in [20] actually defines the conditional expectation of a function with respect to a Choquet capacity ν under a sub-σ-algebra F 0 . In particular,
f is in L ∞ , and ν is convex. 14 Considerf = 1 A , for some A ∈ F; thenf ∈ L ∞ , and
The only issue left to discuss is that [20] requires ν to be convex. This because a result in [9] shows that if ν is convex, then C(ν) = ∅. We do not need to assume this because, in our work, C(ν)
"corresponds" to P * k for some k ∈ N 0 . If P * k = ∅, it means that Jeffrey's update cannot be performed, so our analysis cannot be carried out. Throughout the paper we implicitly assumed that the updates P * k 's are nonempty, and this allows us to relax the convexity assumption. 
To get some intuition of this result consider the indicator function f = 1 A for some A ⊂ X. The left-hand side of (11) tells us how often the orbit of x, (x, T x, T 2 x, . . .) lies in A, and the right-hand side is the measure of A. Hence, for an ergodic endomorphism, "spatial averages are equal to time averages almost everywhere". In addition, if T is continuous and uniquely ergodic with Borel measure m, and f is continuous, then we can replace the almost everywhere convergence in (11) with pointwise convergence.
Appendix C: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.1. We know that P is compact, which implies that it is sequentially compact.
That is,
Now, by Theorem 2.1 in [11] , we have that P * can be obtained by P ∈ P if and only if there is B ∈ [1, ∞) such that P * (A) ≤ BP (A), ∀A ∈ F. Now, pick any (P * n ) ∈ P * N . Then, consider (B n ) ∈ [1, ∞) N , the sequence of constants such that P * n (A) ≤ B n P n (A), ∀n ∈ N, ∀A ∈ F, for some (P n ) ∈ P N , and callB the maximal element such that P * n (A) ≤BP n (A), ∀A ∈ F, ∀n ∈ N. 15 Now, consider the sequence (BP n ); by a previous argument, it has a converging subsequence (BP n k ). But then, the subsequence (P * n k ) ⊂ (P * n ) of Jeffrey's updates obtained by (P n k ) is convergent to an element P * ∈ ∆(Ω, F) because P * n k ≤BP n k , for all k. Also, P * is smaller or equal toBP by construction, and so it belongs to P * . Hence, P * is sequentially compact, and so also compact.
Proof of Corollary 2.1.1. We will use induction.
Base case For k = 1, P * 1 is compact by Proposition 2.1. Inductive step Suppose P * k is compact, for some k ∈ N; then, P * k+1 is compact, again by Proposition 2.1. Clearly, in this case, P * k can be viewed as our (updated) initial plausible set, and so P * k+1 is its update.
By induction, P * k is compact, for all k ∈ N 0 , and the claim follows.
